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Abstract 
Uganda has now been independent since 1962 from the colonial British rule. The period immediately after 
independence saw the country ushered into civil conflicts and violent change of governments, and corruption 
among others.  
Despite the fact that there has been relative peace in the second half of the 53 years of Uganda's independence in 
terms of violent change of governments, the recent happenings in this country like the blatant Human rights 
abuses, tribalism, sectarianism, corruption, state engineered killings, politically motivated imprisonments, over 
militarization of the country's daily affairs are reflecting similar traits that are believed to have characterized the 
country during the first half of independence and are raising questions as to whether the history of violence that 
immediately followed independence is about to repeat itself. A number of reasons have been advanced by 
various researchers and writers to explain the causes of these conflicts including Mr. Museveni, the current 
president of the country, who in his book “Sowing the mastered seed” pointed out the problem of leaders 
clinging on to power as the major cause of violent conflicts in post independent Uganda and Africa at large, yet 
he is in the list of Africa's longest serving presidents.  
This paper therefore attempts to offer another narrative to Uganda’s post-colonial conflicts by  arguing that the 
root causes of Uganda's political unrest after independence are better explained by her colonial history in which 
the British sowed the seeds of the very conflicts through their “divide-and-Rule policy”. That the leaders who 
took over from the colonialists simply inherited this corrupt system that has kept the country in conflict up now. 
In other words, Ugandans are still fighting the colonialists in black skin (rulers). In a nutshell, this paper reflects 
on the post-independence conflicts in Uganda (1966-2006), linking their origin to the divide and rule policy used 
by the British colonial Administrators from 1894 to 1962, as well as presents the current political, economic and 
social problems which are a manifestation of the divide and rule policy. It finally proposes Good governance and 
Democracy, Inclusive Political Settlement, Restoration of presidential term limits, and Reforms in electoral laws 
as some of the most optimal possibilities that may transform the country into a peaceful, patriotic and unified 
post-colonial entity. This study is so significant at this point in time because it analyzes issues that compound 
Uganda’s rogue politics since colonial times till today, which have been deliberately misrepresented by the elite 
to their advantage, as the next presidential election nears. It further gives an understanding of the regional 
imbalances in the country; an understanding of why there has never been peaceful transfer of power in Uganda 
and an understanding of why Mr. Museveni has pursued to extend his candidature for February 2016 presidential 
elections that will extend his rule to 35 years, if he gets through. 
It is however important to note that the study did not explicitly focus on all the causes of the post- colonial 
conflicts in Uganda. There are still a good number of issues, which need to be explored to have a holistic 
understanding of the post-colonial conflicts that besieged the Pearl of Africa. For example, there is need to still 
research on how climate change may have played roll in these conflicts. Secondly, there is also need to further 
explore how “Cold War” dynamics this period may have influenced the actors, which could have turned Uganda 
into an ideological battleground.   
 
1. Introduction 
1.0  The divide and rule policy: A theoretical Overview 
Divide and Rule (divide et impera in Latin) according to Lavie Shay is a very old political strategy. To him it 
basically means that you divide the population in to manageable agglomerations and that makes it impossible for 
them to come together and fight against the sovereign authority (Lavie, Shay. 2008). Elements of this technique 
involve: creating or encouraging divisions among the subjects in order to prevent alliances that could challenge 
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the sovereign; aiding and promoting those who are willing to cooperate with the sovereign; fostering distrust and 
enmity between local rulers; encouraging meaningless expenditures that reduce the capability for political and 
military spending (Grant, Thomas. 2002).  
This strategy according to Acemoglu, Robinson and others is also used in economics and sociology. Economists 
according to them typically interpret divide and rule in terms of a specific class of theoretical models whose 
main feature, roughly speaking, is that a single actor exploits coordination problems among a group by making 
discriminatory offers or discriminatory threats. (Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., & Verdier, T, 2004). Political 
scientists, historians and lawyers, however, sometimes use the term in the economists’ sense, sometimes in other 
senses, augments the trio.   
In order to assure the interconnectedness of the “divide and rule policy” to the theoretical database, hypothesis 
on this subject can be derived from the classical imperialism theory.  
In the classical imperialistic sense, the desire for profit maximization causes production beyond the needs of the 
internal market and leads to the establishment of new markets in underdeveloped areas. Here, the automatic 
production and markets are being destroyed and, thus, unemployment is exported to underdeveloped areas 
(Luxemburg, R. 1913). 
Lenin in addition assumed a decrease of investment possibilities and, therefore, of profit rate in industrialized 
countries. Thus, capital is being exported in order to maximize profits. In the underdeveloped areas, this capital 
is invested, not according to the needs of these countries, but according to the interests of industrial countries 
(Lenin, W.J. 1966). The profit is transferred to the industrial countries whose development is based on the 
exploitation of underdeveloped areas thus inaugurating the concept of colonialism. But such powers according to 
Acemoglu, Robinson and others are typically overstretched and understaffed; their problem is how to achieve 
maximum control with a minimum use of resources and force. Divide and rule is an attractive solution in such 
environments, because it is cheaper to set factions within the latent opposition to fighting among themselves, and 
if necessary to defeat them piecemeal, than it is to defeat them as a unified enemy (Acemoglu, D., Robinson, 
J.A., & Verdier, T, 2004). The British, faced with similar challenges of a growing industrialization that needed 
constant in flow of raw materials to feed these industries as well as market for their surplus products and an ever 
expanding colonial empire that was understaffed, needed nothing else but a cheaper way to solve this problem 
created by their ambitious economic instincts, thus making divide and rule policy a power instrument to achieve 
ambitious economic interests of the classical imperialists.  
In some cases, the imperial divide and rule policy rested straightforwardly on discriminatory offers to split the 
opposition. British policy in India, for example was to create and exploit divisions among the indigenous 
monarchies by means of explicit or implicit subsidies to loyal allies, “who competed with each other for imperial 
favours” (Ashton 1982, 4). Although some of these subsidies were large, some merely involved honors and titles 
(Copland 1982, 94), and in any form they were certainly cheaper than all-out conflict against a unified 
opposition.  
In other cases, imperialist divide and rule tactics involved fomenting divisions among subjugated groups by 
sowing mutual mistrust, rather than by selective bribery. For example, in the British colonies of the American 
southeast, in addition to keeping Indians and Negroes apart, Whites pitted the colored groups against each other. In 1725, Richard Ludlam 
a South Carolina minister, confessed that ‘we make use of a Wile for our [present] Security to make Indians & Negro’s a check upon each 
other by their Vastly Superior Numbers we should be crushed by one or the other.’ . . . In 1758, James Glen, long governor of South 
Carolina, explained . . . that ‘it has always been the policy of this government to create an aversion in them [Indians] to Negroes’ (Willis 
1963, 165). 
However, during colonial Uganda, the British used a combination of similar tactics as in India and Southeast 
America through ethnic cleavages and ethnic division of labour.  
In the case of post independent Uganda, various groups have used this policy by dividing the people on ethnic 
basis to obtain and use state power in order to gain access to scarce resources commanded by the state (Mamdani 
1983). Such a situation then facilitates the economic and political insubordination of other groups and generates 
a discontent among the disadvantaged ethnic groups against the source of deprivation. Ethnic identities are 
therefore strengthened and may become the principle of organization and mobilization for rebellion, Mamdani 
notes.  
Brass observes that “by monopolizing access to cabinet posts and top positions in the military and parastatal 
enterprises, dominant ethnic groups stir up hostilities thereby provoking coups and conflicts”. The Ugandan case 
is illustrative of the entrenchment of ethnicity in politics and how ethnicity has led to political conflicts.  
1.1  Ways in which the British exercised divide and rule policy in Uganda 
After the partition of Africa in Berlin (1884-1885) like sharing a birthday cake, the colonial powers were faced 
with the challenge of administering their shares of the cake (colonies). They devised various strategies to achieve 
this end. France for example adopted the indirect rule through assimilation policy by which they taught their 
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subjects that, by adopting French language and culture, they could become French citizens; Germany, Belgium 
and Portugal among other colonial powers used the direct rule. 
Britain on the other hand adopted indirect rule through divide and rule policy, which they applied in their various 
colonies including Nigeria, which accounts partly for the current scuffles between Nigerian Muslims 
predominantly in the north and Christians predominantly in the south as well as The Sudan, which also partly 
accounts for the birth of the world's newest nation, South Sudan (Chukwa, C, 2000). Not forgetting the troubles 
in Northern Ireland which also trace their origin from the British imperialistic presence in Northern Ireland from 
early antiquity (Hadden P, 1980). With the unfolding of such scenarios, Uganda wouldn't survive this policy as 
one of the British colonies.  
In the first place, the entity called Uganda today is a British concoction from Buganda, a Kingdom that existed 
long before the coming of the colonialists. The present day Uganda was an area where several tribes lived and 
managed their own affairs differently either through kingdoms or chiefdom (Padmore G, 1969). Uganda became 
British protectorate in 1894 until 1962. Britain's declaration of protectorate status over Uganda was motivated by 
the geo-strategic importance of the upper Nile basin and the source of the River Nile to the achievement of 
British interests on the Indian subcontinent (Onek, C .A, 2009). At the time, India was regarded as the jewel in 
the British Imperial crown. The theory and believe among European powers was that the control of the source of 
the River Nile was necessary for the security of Egypt and the Suez Canal, a vital access route to India that had 
opened in 1869. The confirmation by John Hannington Speke and James A. Grant in 1862 that Uganda was the 
source of the River Nile reinforced the strategic importance of Uganda and the Upper Nile basin to Britain's 
strategy in Egypt and the Far East. From the early 19th century onwards, Britain secured the source of the River 
Nile and the entire Upper Nile basin through the informal control of the leaders in the north and East Africa 
(Onek, C .A, 2009).  
Politically, the British being driven by their ambition to secure the source of the Nile and yet were faced with the 
challenge of inadequate personnel as well as limited resources resorted to using a cheap means to conquer 
Uganda, the “divide and rule policy”. By this policy, the British made use of a well-established traditional state, 
Buganda on a relatively large scale; they over emphasized the differences and prejudices rather than the 
similarities between the people of Uganda (Kabwegyere, 1974).  
In compliance with the divide and rule policy, the British protectorate government established different systems 
of administration over the entire protectorate. Their first alliance with Buganda was in a military expedition 
against Bunyoro under King Kabalega in 1899 followed by negotiations for a treaty with important Buganda 
chiefs which gave birth to the 1900 Buganda agreement (Padmore G, 1969). This agreement rewarded the chiefs 
with grants of freehold land (contrary to traditional custom) and rewarded Buganda generally by giving them 
administrative control over the part of Bunyoro annexed to Buganda as a result of their defeat. This agreement 
further guaranteed the position of the Kabaka (King) and introduced a modified version of a traditional Baganda 
hierarchy of chiefs, acting under the supervision of the British officers. It also entrenched religious divisions 
among them by favoring protestant over Catholic or Muslim chiefs. The resulting hierarchy of landlord-chiefs, 
from the parish up to the county level, all paying homage to, and taking orders from the colonial government, 
was basically protestant. Once established, this Buganda system of administration was extended to the rest of the 
country. The British then used the Baganda chiefs to conquer the rest of Uganda and to establish an effective 
colonial administration.  
However, by treating Buganda as a state within a state, the British planted the seeds of ethnic tensions and 
conflicts in Uganda. The Baganda then developed a high sense of ethnic nationalism and this was reinforced by 
their economic and political centrality in Uganda. Other parts of Uganda were then considered by the British as 
satellites of Buganda. This has since then led to anti-Baganda sentiments in the rest of Uganda (Onek, C .A, 
2009). 
In fact, by declaring Uganda a protectorate, neither the interests nor the opinions of the indigenous people was 
taken into account. Likewise, in governing Uganda through informal control, that is, by collaborating with the 
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Baganda or indigenous elite, the interests of the communities over which these elite governed were not 
considered. As noted by Kasozi, in a number of instances, the communities showed their discontent at the new 
mode of informal control through riots directed at the newly-created corps of British imposed indigenous leaders 
(Kasozi.A.B, 1994). These indigenous chiefs were the necessary agents of direct colonial rule over subjugated 
areas for the principal purpose of advancing and protecting British interests. 
Buganda type of agreements were there after signed with traditional rulers in other kingdoms like Bunyoro, 
Ankole and Toro, while local chiefs were set up in the remaining districts.  
Consequently, the British expanded the Kingdom of Ankole to the west to include smaller kingdoms like 
Mpororo and Buhweju and also expanded Toro kingdom to include parts of Bunyoro, while reducing Bunyoro in 
size as a punishment for rebelling against British colonialism (Onek, C .A, 2009). This therefore means that none 
of these kingdoms corresponded exactly to the areas under their influence before British colonialism leading to 
ethnic tensions in Uganda given the fact that the new adjustments could not take care of the different ethnic 
interests of the new areas being expanded in to. Besides, the British sent Chief Semei Kakungulu, a Muganda 
collaborator to Busoga, Teso and Bukedi in Eastern Uganda to transform these scattered chiefdoms in to tribal 
organizations. Some of Buganda collaborators went as far as Lango and Acholi in northern Uganda and Kigezi 
in western Uganda. In these areas, the collaborators were used to rule people who had no history of hierarchical 
rule. They spread out as local tax collectors and labour organizers in these areas. This sub-imperialism and 
Ganda cultural chauvinism were resented by the people being administered. Wherever they went, the Baganda 
insisted on the exclusive use of their language, Luganda, and they planted bananas as the only proper food worth 
eating. They regarded their traditional dress, long cotton gowns called “kanzu” as civilized; all else was barbaric. 
They also encouraged and engaged in mission work, attempting to convert locals to their form of Christianity or 
Islam. In some areas, the resulting backlash aided the efforts of religious rivals. For example, Catholics won 
converts in areas where oppressive rule was identified with a Protestant Muganda chief. 
Economically, the British created regional imbalances and ethnic specialization, an economic distortion which 
compounded the problem of ethnicity during this colonial era (Mamdani 1983). Building upon pre-colonial 
differences, the Britain turned the southern part (Buganda, Busoga and Ankole) in to cash crop growing areas. 
But cash crop production was officially discouraged in northern areas (West Nile, Acholi, and Lango), and in 
Kigezi in the west which were developed as labor reserves, from whence were recruited not only soldiers and 
policemen, but also workers in factories and plantations in the south. The result of this 'division of labour 
according to Mamdani was the building of ethnic cleavages that would entrench ethnic consciousness in the long 
run in the country. The Asians came from India (now also Pakistan and Bangladesh); some of them had been 
brought by the British to do clerical work, but most came in connection with the construction of the Uganda 
Railway, when over 31,000 labourers were imported for this six-year project. The British allowed the Asians to 
dominate the commercial sector because they were allegedly regarded as a non-national trading class isolated 
from the people of Uganda, and hence easy to neutralize politically in the pursuit of colonial interests (Mamdani 
1983).Therefore, through divide and rule policy, the British managed to antagonize one region against another 
and one tribe against another.  
As Mamdani summarized it up, “Every institution touched by the hand of the colonial state was given a 
pronounced regional or nationality character. It became a truism that a soldier must be a northerner, a civil 
servant a southerner, and a merchant an Asian” (Mamdani, 1983, p 10). 
These economic distortions created by the British became troublesome for post independent Uganda. This 
institutional 'division of labour' was easily exploited by the ruling elites from these regions to acquire and retain 
power undemocratically during post-colonial period.  
Socially, the Baganda were considered by the British superior to the rest of the tribes and it was in fact by 
extending the Buganda rule that the rest of Uganda was consolidated. This meant that Buganda's political 
institutions were exported to the rest of the protectorate, they were used as partners in the conquest of Uganda. 
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This kind of move developed a dislike for the Baganda and were regarded worse than the British by the rest of 
the ethnic groups.  
In addition, the location of the colonial administrative centers in Kampala and Entebbe both in Buganda was not 
only a pivotal point from which colonial expansion to the rest of Uganda passed off, but it ushered them in to 
benefits in the fields of education, medical services, transport and telecommunication among others than the rest 
of the country. Meaning better social infrastructures like schools, hospitals, roads, etc were developed in 
Buganda than other parts of Uganda. For example, until independence in 1962, the Baganda filled a 
disproportionate number in secondary school places. In 1920, Buganda had 360 schools, western and eastern 
provinces had 42 each and there was none in northern Uganda (Kabwegyere, 1974).  
Industrialization grew in Buganda at the expense of other regions. When the capital city Kampala, already 
offering central government jobs attracted industry, the Baganda were more available to take up wage 
employment from which they built up skills and became more stable employees, leaving unwaged work to 
migrants from other parts of Uganda thus dividing the country into the south rich and the rest poor. The British 
policy of divide and rule enhanced the spirit of ethnic consciousness and chauvinism which became a source of 
tension and conflict in post independent Uganda. Uganda's post independent leaders simply perpetuated the 
divide and rule policy through ethnic incompatibility as started by the British to obtain and use state power in 
order to gain access to scarce resources commanded by the state. This would therefore partly explain the reason 
and the nature of conflicts in post-independence Uganda. 
1.1.1 How the conflicts in post-independence Uganda are a manifestation of the divide       and rule 
policy of the British.  
The post-independence Uganda in this paper refers to the early independent Uganda commonly referred to as 
Obote I (1962-71), Uganda under Idi Amini (1971-79), the Interim period (1979-1980), the return of Obote also 
commonly known as Obote II (1980-5) and Uganda under Museveni (1986-2015).  
1.1.2 Uganda under Obote I (1962-71) 
Politically, the early post-independence Uganda was a period characterized by leadership struggle (Mudoold.D, 
1985). 
The indirect rule approach the British employed in Uganda by the use of a stronger existing political 
structure(Buganda kingdom) to advance their imperialistic interests in the whole country through empowering 
them politically, economically and socially created a fragile ground on which Uganda got her independence, he 
continues. This divisive and fragmented political, Economic, social and religious foundation on which the British 
founded and build the multi-ethnic state of Uganda to their advantage kept Ugandans playing the British game of 
divide and rule even when their unity was sorted for during and after independence. This created a fluid situation 
which could only be filled by anyone who knew how to play the British game ('divide and rule') every well 
(Mamdani 1983). The first action of the players (local elites) in this game was to set the people of Uganda 
against each other and hide the actual enemy from them. That is, instead of pointing at the repressive colonial 
army, for example, they talked of northerners as the enemy; instead of indicating the colonial chiefs, they 
pointed at the Baganda as the enemy; and instead of singling out the comparators, they defined Asians as the 
enemy (Mamdani 1983). They divided the people and set them against each other, and the colonialists came in 
and played referee, again. Players like Milton Obote who even had no likelihood of leadership through 
democratic means that time because of his northern background saw political manipulation and maneuvering 
along the divided lines the British had created as the only way to take over from them, thus the beginning of the 
scuffles. Such post-colonial practices by the players, who inherited the nation state, saw reproduction rather than 
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deconstruction of political, social and economic distortions created by the British in Uganda (Kabwegyere, 
1974).  
On the eve of independence religious and ethnic identities surfaced as the basis for party formation as the 
sidelined ethnic and religious groups struggled for the same political space which the Baganda and Protestants 
had enjoyed alongside the imperialists. For example, Democratic Party was formed by a coalition of Catholic 
landlords, the Catholic Church and the Catholic Action Movement on the basis of having been discriminated 
against since Protestantism was treated as a state religion by the British. There was also Uganda national 
congress, which later due to sectarianism got split in to two factions; its Buganda section was the Kabaka Yekka 
(KY) under the Buganda King, and its non-Buganda section was the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) under 
Milton Obote (Muzrui. A, 1977). 
The people, especially from Northern Uganda who had for long been bitter of Buganda’s prestige and privileges 
since colonial time, rallied behind Milton Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), which was clearly non-
Baganda but Protestant majority. Obote, upon discovering that he would not be able to govern Uganda without 
Baganda support, a precedence set by the British, formed an alliance with Buganda’s Kabaka Yekka (King 
before All) party in exclusion of the Democratic Party, which was Catholic dominated (Muzrui. A, 1977).  
At Independence in 1962, Obote became Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II, President on agreement that 
Buganda would continue to exercise authority over the other kingdoms just like during the British 
administration, as well as being represented in the National Assembly (Mamdani.M, 1976). The alliance 
disintegrated shortly thereafter as it was just a manipulative move by Obote to gain support within Buganda to 
advance his political ambition. 
As noted by Mamdani, the role that ethnic identity was to play over the coming decades was clear from the 
beginning.  
Drawing from British tradition that a soldier must be a northerner, a civil servant a southerner and a merchant an 
Indian, Obote filled the army and civil service with members of his own and neighboring ethnic groups, 
predominantly Lango and Acholi from northern Uganda. With the aid of these northern troops and ministers, 
Prime Minister Obote suspended the constitution and assumed all government powers, removing the positions of 
president and vice president. In September 1967, Uganda was proclaimed a republic by a new constitution, 
which gave the president even greater powers, and abolished the traditional kingdoms, the Kabaka fled in exile 
(Mudoola, D 1985). This marked the beginning of pure Obote regime (Obote I) up to 1971 and it also marked 
the end of the development of systematic democratization process in post-colonial Uganda. In this period the 
Baganda became the enemy and objects of Obote's government, lost key government positions, many 
imprisoned, killed and exiled. While it is true that Obote was trying to break the heaviest concentration of power 
in Buganda in order to safeguard his position and perhaps concentrate on the nation-building objective, 
Kabwegyere holds that instead of using democratic means, he sort to use of undemocratic means (force and 
military as power base).  
In a further effort to tighten its control over political life, Obote's government like the British colonialists 
discriminated in favour of Protestants, in favour of his fellow tribes men Longo and Acholi and in favour of his 
party UPC, for example in state schools, in top governmental positions, in the army and in the civil service. In 
other words, for Obote to consolidate his political leadership in Uganda, he had to keep high the divided lines 
and sectarianism the British had created to consolidate their colonial administration in the country; that is, 
manipulated the Baganda and used them to the maximum, northerners in the army and later in the civil service as 
well as key political positions, favored his supporters but persecuted anyone who dared to oppose him. Obote's 
regime terrorized, harassed and tortured people. His secret police, the general service unit led by his cousin 
caused a lot of atrocities.  
In 1969, Obote released his famous 'common man's charter' in which he outlined his plans for Uganda and 
clearly stated a shift to socialism (moderate communism), which came to be known as 'the move to the left'. This 
did not go well with the British who felt that this move would diminish their influence over their former colony 
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and so fell out with Obote's government. This government could not last long from this point as Obote's attempt 
to assassinate commander in chief, Idi Amin Failed leading to his overthrow by Idi Amin in 1971 in a coup.  
In conclusion, Obote did not make any difference from the colonialists. He consolidated his rule through 
manipulation and discrimination in favor of his party UPC, Langi and the neibouring tribe Acholi and in favuor 
of Protestants. He manipulated the Baganda like the British to assume power and ruled by exclusion instead of 
uniting all Ugandans. He demonstrably, utilized and kept live the political, economic and social fault lines 
created by the British to play his cards instead of deconstructing them. He as such set the basis for the politics of 
revenge in Uganda against which he suffered as Idi Amini bombed him out of office in a coup that saw Lango 
and Acholi officers being murdered brutally. This clearly shows how Obote prepared Uganda for war by heavily 
employing the British colonial policy of divide and rule. 
1.1.3  Uganda under Idi Amin Dada (1971-79)  
Idi Amin took over power in January 1971 in a coup that toppled president Milton Obote. He used the same 
tactics Obote had used against Kabaka to ascend to power. Like the British and Obote, Amin worked hard to 
legitimize his government and to gain support in Buganda. He promised security, rule of law, elections, 
economic progress, lower prices and taxes, arranged the return of the Kabaka’s body from the UK (where he had 
died two years earlier) and allowed his son, the present Kabaka to pass through some of that office’s rites, but he 
did not restore the kingdoms (Oloka-Onyango, 1997: 176). This was in a way to fulfill the precedence the British 
had set, which became a sort of truism that to rule Uganda, one must pass through Buganda and is the same 
precedence that came to be followed by the later rulers (Mamdani, 1983). Large sections of the people received 
the new regime favourably because they were disenchanted with the previous one, and expected a change for the 
better.  
The chanting of the new regime could not go any further and people’s expectations could not be met as Amin 
went back to the old cocoon of ethnic cleavage. He proclaimed himself president, abrogated the parliament, 
conferred more powers on himself through constitutional amendment and started ruling by decree. The coup had 
only narrowly outflanked Acholi and Langi officers on whom Obote had relied. They became objects of Amin's 
political persecution as many were massacred (International Crisis Group, 2012). 
Amin depended on low ranking, little educated ethnic and religious kin he had personally recruited into the 
army. He secured his regime by murdering Langi and Acholi officers and soldiers who had not fled, suspending 
most of the constitution, giving himself absolute authority. Officers were given powers of arrest without 
authorization. Prominent civilians were murdered. His regime was probably responsible for well over 100,000 
deaths by the time it was overthrown, and its unpredictable brutality accelerated the erosion of rule of law 
(Hansen H.B, 1977, Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
Amin also expelled both citizen and Non-citizen Indians, who were identified by the players as enemies in 1972. 
He justified this act by considering the Indians as colonial perpetrators and thus parasites milking the economy 
of Uganda and that getting rid of them would give the Ugandans the chance to manage their own economy. This 
action wrecked the economy by removing some 90 per cent of the trading network but gave him unprecedented 
patronage resources and the opportunity to build support by giving Indian businesses to allies, which was not in a 
way different from what the British did by rewarding Buganda, their chief alley with a large chunk of land 
grabbed in a military expedition against Bunyoyo. State officials became far more significant to the economy, 
because they controlled most imported commodities and sold or bartered them privately. Patronage and 
corruption thus became firmly entrenched at all levels of public service. No government since has been able to 
eradicate either (International Crisis Group, 2012).  
Amin tried to improve the status of Muslims in general and those from the North West in particular, who had 
been isolated during British colonialism and Obete's regime. He rapidly promoted Muslims despite their lack of 
academic qualifications. The resulting Catholic and Protestant resentment further politicized religious fault lines 
created by the British. As opposition widened, ethnic, regional and religious cleavages determined whom he 
trusted. The composition of the military leadership changed radically; by 1977 more than three quarters of those 
serving owed their appointments to Amin. The percentage of officers who spoke Sudanic languages – indicating 
they came from ethnic groups predominantly in West Nile, Amin’s home area, rose from 37 per cent to 54 per 
cent. West Nile cabinet ministers increased from one sixth in 1971 to over half in 1978 (Hansen H.B, 1977). 
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This was the trend of political development in post-independence Uganda, so tribalistic, sectarian, egoistic, 
chauvinistic; all owing to political, economic, religious and social fault lines created by the British egoistic 
policy of 'divide et impera'. Amin's regime, which has been described by historians like Mamdani as “the reign 
of terror” was brought to an end in 1979 when he invaded Tanzania and was thereafter ousted in a joint 
expedition by the Tanzanian army and some Ugandan dissident forces called Uganda National Liberation Front 
(UNLF) 
In conclusion, Idi Amin's regime to me was a replica of that of his predecessor Obote and at most as brutal as the 
colonial regime. He still depended on the colonial policy of divide-and-Rule as the masterpiece of his 
administration as elaborated above. He was not a kind of leader who would unite Ugandans. His dictatorial and 
authoritarian government was only a mechanism to amass wealth and to keep himself in power. Tribalism, 
sectarianism, manipulation, and corruption were some of the working tools he inherited from the colonialists just 
like his predecessor. This increased his unpopularity both within and without, thus giving the gun more chances 
to determine the future of Uganda. Sad to note that the rest of the rulers after Idi Amin followed the same trend, 
thus explaining the scuffles immediately after the fall of Amin as well as the later scuffles in Obote's second 
government and in the current regime of President Museveni. 
1.1.4  Uganda in the Interim Period (1979-1980) 
Uganda after Amin commonly known as the interim period continued to be politically, economically, and 
socially unstable as the country got entangled in militarism, lawlessness, tribalism, frequent change of 
governments and gross human rights abuses. For exable, in less than a year after Idi Amin, three governments 
ruled Uganda in the persons of Yusuf Lule, who became very incompetent as a leader was then replaced by 
Godfrey Binaisa (International Crisis Group, 2012). However, Binaisa became very autocratic due to his 
unpopularity as such he sacked some of his army chiefs including Yoweri Museveni, who was by then the 
minister of defence, and the army chief of staff. This made the army officials to replace Binaisa with Paul 
Muanga who ruled Uganda till the time of general elections in 1980, which ushered Obote to power. The interim 
period clearly shows how fragmented Uganda continued to be after Idi Amin. With more players (tribes) in the 
field competing for the same political space, short time governments characterized this period. It was clear that 
the enmity the tribes developed against each other as a deliberate colonial construct, and as being perpetuated by 
the first two leaders would continue keeping the country in total turmoil. No wonder amidst this confusion, 
Obote found his way back with more deadly mechanisms that only extended the life of the gun in Uganda's 
politics. There is nothing else other than the divide-and-Rule policy at the foreplay of these conflicts. 
1.1.5 Uganda under Obote's second term (Obote II 1980-85) 
With the return of Obote through what was termed as fraudulent elections in 1980, Uganda once again show the 
history of tribal cleavage repeating itself (Kabwegyere, T.B, 1974). The Acholi and Lango on power made sure 
that they compensated for the lives lost during the previous regimes consequently the army made one of the 
worst Human rights Abuse records in the history of Uganda. Obote could not learn from his past mistakes, 
neither did he realize that he still remained a colonialist in black skin in the eyes of Ugandans than a change 
agent. At this point, Uganda needed a leader who would dismantle the colonial constructions that kept Uganda in 
conflict by emphasizing national unity, democracy, economic and social reforms but Obote who returned to 
power for the second time proved of no help. This led to widespread armed opposition against Obote's second 
government including People's Resistance Army led by Yoweri Museveni, which later came to be known as 
National Resistance Army after joining with Uganda Freedom Fighters under Yusuf Lule. Museveni's army 
gained trust and support even among the rural Baganda, Ankole and Toro in terms of food donation, enrollment 
in the army as well as offering intelligence services to the army. In an effort to crush Museveni's opposition, 
Obote launched “Operation Bonanza” which led to the death of an estimated number of 10,000 Ugandans in 
Luwero triangle according to Human Rights Watch, 1999. This increased Obote's unpopularity even in his own 
government leading to his deposition by Bazilio Okello, his own army genral from his tribe in 1985 
(Mamdani.M, 1976). Meanwhile, Museveni intensified his fight against military regime, which to him was the 
cause of Uganda's unrest until he toppled Okollo after taking over Kampala on 26th of January, 1986. This 
marked the beginning of Museveni's regime till today. 
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1.1.6  Uganda under Yoweri Museveni Kaguta 
Once on power through a coup in 1986, Museveni through the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government embarked on political, social and economic recovery of the country. He declared a “fundamental 
change” and the end of tribal, ethnic and regional sectarianism in Uganda (Kjær, 1999). In order to further 
legitimize his government, Museveni sort to establish a broad-based government which was more open to 
include even the former enemies. In other words Museveni appeared at first to follow a more inclusive 
democratic path by supporting a new political recipe to restore civilian control, rule of law and economic growth 
(International Crisis Group, 2012). His government worked out to create a non-partisan “democratic” system that 
was widely embraced. His army proved more disciplined and sensitive to civilian control than its predecessors. 
He recognized the kingdoms abolished by the first president, Obote, in 1967 as cultural, but not political entities. 
Museveni also recalled the Indians who had been expelled by Idi Amin .An elaborate consultative process led to 
a 1995 constitution with checks and balances intended to prevent inordinate centralization. The Constitution also 
guaranteed a variety of basic human rights, including the expression of individual freedom, the right of 
assembly,etc (Barkan D. Joel, 2005). 
All in all, Museveni and his NRM government may be said to have been more successful than his predecessors 
in that first, the NRM government restored peace and security in Uganda by reestablishing an effective 
government through constitutional development and rule of law as well as professionalizing the army, which 
brought to an end violent change of governments. Second, it regenerated the economy from a state of economic 
suffocation to real economic development. Thirdly, it started but remains unaccomplished the democratization 
process, that is to say, the establishment of democratic institutions through which Ugandans of all regions, ethnic 
backgrounds, and political orientations have a meaningful stake in the political system and resolve their 
differences under democratic rules (Barkan D. Joel, 2005). The failure of the NRM government to accomplish 
the democratization process according to Barkan D, Joel has thrown the country back to the undemocratic 
practices like during the colonial regime and the regimes that immediately followed independence.  
On realizing that he was becoming unpopular in the country, Museveni like his predecessors resorted to 
undemocratic means to keep himself on power. For example, he filled the army (UPDF) and civil service with 
members of his own and neighbouring ethnic groups, predominantly Banyankole, Bakiga, and Batoro from 
western Uganda. This has been evidenced in a report by Advocates Coalition on Development and Environment 
(ACODE), 2009 that by 2008, the command structure of the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) 
substantially changed that is to say, 74 per cent of the officers in top positions come from western Uganda 
distinguishable from 17 per cent from the central region, 9 per cent from the north and zero from the east. 
Therefore, based on this kind of report, it is reasonable to argue that there seems to be no major differences in the 
regional and tribal compositions of the command structures of the army in comparison with his predecessors and 
that President Museveni’s continued defamation of the previous leaders only helps keep the tribalism issue at the 
center of public policy discourse in the country (Advocates Coalition on Development and Environment 
(ACODE), 2009). Not only that but he further removed presidential term limits through manipulative 
constitutional amendment to give him unlimited time to remain in power; corruption is at the helm. The 
intricacies of what Museveni has turned out to be after promising a lot to Ugandans constitute the basis of the 
current political, economic and social problems in Uganda.  
2.0 The current political, economic and social problems in Uganda which are a manifestation of the 
divide and rule policy 
The honey moon years of NRM government on power under Museveni were indeed years of political, social and 
economic recovery, and thus of nation building after decades of total turmoil in Uganda. As Barkan and Carson 
noted, there has been a significant measure of political liberalization in the country especially from early 90s till 
today. This according to them has been evidenced by emergency of “a free media and civil society”, though 
mostly operational in urban areas like the capital city, Kampala. The constitution of the republic of Uganda, 
promulgated in 1995 was also a step forward towards constitutionalism and the rule of law among other notable 
achievements. However, the current political, social and economic situation in Uganda are becoming so pathetic 
and deplorable that many Ugandans believe the current regime is falling back in to the mistakes of the past 
rulers.  
Politically, Uganda's systematic journey towards a fledged democracy is systematically being abrogated by 
Museveni's NRM government and the country is slowly going back to “one man role” like during the previous 
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regimes. This has however been pointed out by Barkan and Carson that “after an extended period of political 
liberalization which resulted in the strengthening of parliament, the judiciary, watchdog agencies such as the 
Inspector General of Government (IGG) and a free media, Uganda has slipped back into a period of neo-
patrimonial, or “big man” rule”. Museveni's NRM government continues to keep herself in power through a 
bunch of corruption, use of force, patronage, as well as political manipulation through transition from one-party 
to multi-party rule (Barkan D. Joel & Carson, 2005).  
It is therefore not surprising that the IMF, in its most recent country report on Uganda, stated that the country is 
“at a crossroad” and must “launch a second wave of reforms and consolidate peace throughout its territory.” It 
went on to note that in respect to four of the six indicators of “good governance,” Uganda’s rating now falls 
below the average for sub-Saharan Africa (Muzrui. A, 1977). This downward trend is also reflected by the 
ratings of other organizations. 
Freedom House, for example in its annual report of political rights and civil liberties indicates that Uganda has 
fallen in respect to both. On a pair of scales ranging from “7” at the lowest to “1” for the highest, Uganda 
received a “5” for political rights in 1994 and 1995. Its rating rose to “4” from 1996 through 1999 but dropped 
back to “5” in 2000,and then to “6” in 2003.Though Uganda’s political rights score rose slightly to “5” in 2003 it 
remains below those for both Kenya (“3”) and Tanzania (“4”) (International Crisis Group, 2012). 
A similar picture as presented in the same report by International Crisis Group, 2012 emerges with respect to 
civil liberties. Uganda received a “5” from 1994 through 1996. Its score rose to “4” from 1997 through 1999, but 
dropped back to “5” in 2000, and “6” in 2001. It rose again to “4” from 1997 through 1999, but dropped back to 
“5” in 2000, and “6” in 2001. It rose again to “4” in 2003, but also remains below the civil liberties scores for 
Kenya and Tanzania both of which are now rated“3”. 
However, Uganda's current political life fabric is being dominated by a number of issues, but notable among 
them include the following; 1. The transition to multi-partism and the removal of presidential term limits. 2. 
Museveni's succession scuffle: The Muhoozi project. 3. The widespread corruption in the country. 4. The human 
rights issues. 5. The homosexuality bill 
2.1  The Transition to Multiparty Politics and the Repeal of Presidential Term Limits (“Project 
Kisanja”) 
President Museveni resisted for many years the transition to multiparty politics on the grounds that multiparty 
politics were the root cause of Uganda’s instability in the 1960s, and during subsequent attempts at civilian rule 
(Mudoola. D, 1985). Indeed, the Movement system as noted by Mudoola was viewed by Museveni and his 
colleagues in the NRM as an alternative to multiparty politics that was ideally suited to Uganda’s history and 
needs. The Movement system was originally conceived as a competitive political system within a “no-party” or 
“non-partisan framework—i.e. the NRM was not a party in the conventional sense, but rather a “big tent” to 
which all Ugandans belonged and within which all could compete on the basis of their own “individual merit” 
rather than on the basis of their party affiliations. Of course, one may view this as a brilliant move by Museveni 
to unite Ugandans after being divided by the sectarian and tribalistic multi party political system at independence 
and the periods that followed. 
However, since the late 1990s, and especially after the elections of 2001, the Movement has morphed into an 
old-style one-party state reminiscent of Africa during the 1980s (International Crisis Group, 2012). Some 
members of the Movement—those loyal and closest to Museveni—were increasingly regarded as “more 
Movement” than others. The “big tent” to the Crisis group became a fusion of party and government dominated 
by the President seeking to centralize power. The result is that the Movement today [now renamed the National 
Resistance Movement Organization (NRMO) and registered as a party under the Political Parties and 
Organization Act] is an organization that revolves around one man and his followers. 
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The combination of the switch to multiparty politics and the repeal of term limits has split the Movement. 
Several of Museveni’s oldest and closest colleagues dating back to 1986 and earlier have left government or 
been forced out, because of their stated unhappiness with the President’s intention to continue in office after two 
decades in power. Among this group are Bidandi Ssali, the former Minister of Local Government and the 
architect of Uganda’s famed system of decentralized government; Eryia Kategaya, a former vice-president once 
touted as Museveni’s likely successor; Augustine Ruzindana, the former head of the Public Accounts Committee 
in the National Assembly; and Mugisha Muntu, a former commander of the Army. The former and late National 
Political Commissar of the NRM, James Wapakhabulo, is also reported to have opposed the repeal of term 
limits. And of course there is Besigye (Mamdani, 1983).It is important to note that all of these Movement 
heavyweights, with the exception of Ssali and Wapakhabulo, come from Museveni’s home area of Mbarara and 
are ethnic Banyankole.The President has been deserted by his own men. This group of former “Movementists” 
strongly believes that Uganda’s future stability and prosperity is contingent on an orderly and democratic 
transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. Notwithstanding this opposition, President Museveni become 
so brutal in dealing with his opponents. For example, strong armed tactics have already been used to deny 
permits, breakup meetings, and otherwise cow MPs who have joined together to create the Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC).The FDC, led by former Movement stalwarts, is regarded as the most potent threat to 
Museveni and the NRMO—far more potent than the Democratic Party (DP) or Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC), two old holdovers from the 1960s. 
In fact, there has not been any meaningful election in Uganda ever since the inception of multi-party political 
dispensation. Most elections have been marred by mismanagement of tax payer’s money for vote bribing, 
stealing of votes, controlling the electoral body for favors, use of the military to intimidate voters as well as 
opposition politicians. This is what gave birth to the famours “walk to work protest” in April 2011 in which 
peaceful protestors were brutalized by government forces in a bid to crack down the protests. 
Given these realities, all signs point towards a Moi/Mugabe-type election—i.e. an uneven playing field for those 
who oppose the Movement and the third term or even the fourth term as it stands now, intimidation of the 
opposition, rising violence, etc. What then, given Uganda’s past? In this regard, it is important to remember that 
in its 53 years of existence as an independent state, Uganda has never had a constitutional and peaceful transfer 
of power from one elected government to another. Should the President prevail by force or intimidation, it is 
possible that some elements of the opposition will go underground and pursue the very option that Museveni 
himself pursued successfully two and a half decades ago—a guerilla insurgency. The regime already accuses its 
opponents, and the FDC in particular, of planning this option. It is a recipe for trouble and is likely to be either 
highly destabilizing or to lead to widespread repression. Should events spin out of control, Uganda’s success will 
indeed be a record of the past. 
2.1.1  Museveni's succession scuffle: “Project Muhoozi”. 
The Muhoozi project is a succession plan to install Museveni's son, Brig. Muhoozi Kainerugaba as a replacement 
for president Museveni. The fire was stoked by coordinator of Intelligence Agencies, Gen. David Sejusa 
formerly Tinyefuza after he wrote a letter to the Director General of Internal Security Organisation (ISO) calling 
for an investigation into allegations that certain individuals opposed to an alleged “Project Muhoozi” had been 
targeted for assassination (The Daily Monitor, 7th, May, 2013). 
In this letter, Gen. Sejusa further talked of a plan by President Museveni and a small circle of close family to 
install Brig. Muhoozi kainerugaba, currently head of the Special Forces Command, to succeed him as President. 
This led to the closer of Daily Monitor, a private print media that first published the letter followed by the Red 
pepper tabloid in a raid to search for the letter. 
The government responded by claiming that this was diversionary and baseless to incite Ugandans. Museven on 
a private TV personally denied the claims by saying that he does not have the power to choose a leader for 
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Uganda but his party, NRM has and that another person can only come in place when he chooses not to stand 
again for presidency or when his party chooses another person. He vowed to prosecute those propagating such 
deceitful and contagious lies. 
Critical looking, I personally believe that there is some truth as presented in the letter by Gen. David Sejusa. 
Basing on the saying that “there is smoke without fire”, there are a number of events I can recall in Uganda 
under Museveni that could explain the existence of such a project. 
Firstly, the rapid rise of his son, Muhoozi to a Brigadier now in charge of Special Forces Command at the 
expense of NRM historicals who fought with Museveni to take over power points to that fact. Secondly, the 
underpinning reasons for the desire to choose Brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba as a successor to his father to me 
is the First Family’s survival strategy in a post-Museveni era in Uganda. To achieve that objective, Gen. Yoweri 
Museveni needs a poodle. A servile or obsequious person, a person trusted to a fault to guarantee Museveni’s 
future and protect his loot as well as prevent independent investigations into the Luwero, Teso and Northern 
Uganda mass murders by the regime. A servile successor will ensure that Museveni and his cohorts will never be 
prosecuted for the serious crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes including crimes of massive 
corruption and abuse of office. The choice of his son, Baby Museveni, otherwise known as Muhoozi, is a logical 
one, particularly for a desperate Commander-in-Chief of the army, NRA/UPDF, who does not want to end up 
like Ben Ali of Tunisia, Muammar Gadhafi of Libya or Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The crimes Gen. Museveni has 
committed against the Ugandan civilian population since 1981 weighs, or should weigh, heavily on him. 
Similarly, the alleged crimes he committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) --the massacres of 
Congolese civilians and plundering of Congo's resources-- will not go away; for such crimes have no statute of 
limitation. Gen. Museveni needs protection particularly when he is no longer president and exercises no 
executive and military power. He will be extremely vulnerable to national and international criminal 
prosecutions. However, the choice of Muhoozi to succeed his father, while appealing to Museveni, may not fully 
protect him. Papa Doc tried and imposed his son on Haitian people. After his death, such succession did not 
protect Baby Doc and family. 
Now a Ugandan general who still reported to Museveni, Gen. David Sejusa Tinyefuza’s disclosure that there is a 
"Muhoozi Project" for succession, is therefore not a surprise. It is also not a surprise that persons opposed to the 
idea of Muhoozi replacing his father as president of Uganda may be targeted for assassination. Gen. Tinyefuza 
wrote a letter published in Uganda's The Daily Monitor, asking that the rumors be investigated. He said he and 
former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi were included as some of the alleged targets. The track record of the 
National Resistance Army/National Resistance Army (NRA/NRM) suggests that since its formation and 
throughout its existence, for a variety of reasons, the NRA/NRM has eliminated, and continues to eliminate, 
those it considers undesirables from within and without its rank. Those undesirables are generally known as 
"biological substance". The undesirable description has since been expanded to include "cockroaches" and that is 
one of the reasons Gen. Tinyefuza was afraid, that on arrival at Entebbe in Uganda from London, he may have 
been arrested like a "cockroach". Gen Tinyefuza is best placed to know how the NRA/NRM treats cockroaches 
as the presidential advisor on security matters. If in doubt, ask Daniel Omara Atubo, a former minister of State 
for Defense, one of Tinyefuza’s victims who were treated as a cockroach, by being publicly flogged, humiliated 
and thrown in detention for one year before being released. The derogatory term "cockroach" is used by the 
NRA/NRM to dehumanize its "enemies" in a similar manner used against victims during the Rwanda genocide. 
The NRA/NRM historical record demonstrates that it has always been careful to leave a window of opportunity 
for a "plausible deniability" explanation of many political killings by creating alternative versions of causes of 
death of persons suspected to have been murdered by the agents of the regime. The untimely death of the young 
Brig. Noble Mayombo is one such recent examples. Similarly, unexplained deaths of Dr. Andrew Kayira, a 
former minister in the NRM government, the former Vice- President Gilbert Bukenya’s son, former Speaker of 
Parliament Francis Ayume and former Member of Parliament Ms. Cerinah Nebanda are examples of alleged 
political murders with ‘plausible deniability’. Gen. Tinyefuza’s concerns on being a target for possible 
assassination alongside others, coming from one who knows how the system works and is also a suspect in some 
of the criminals acts committed against the ‘enemies’ of the NRA/NRM, must be taken seriously. Only the 
willfully blind can ignore such warnings. This is clearly a politics of manipulation, exploitation, a politics that 
thrives on the blood of those who would like to hold fast to the values of objective truth that would benefit all 
Ugandans. It is a politics that has its roots in the divide-and-Rule police as introduced by the British that thrived 
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through setting Ugandans against each other, killing prominent anti-colonialists, etc. This is what Museveni has 
learned to practice on his own people to keep himself in power. 
2.1.2  High level of corruption for the purpose of regime maintenance  
Corruption is the third major issue facing Uganda. Though it is very hard to make a quantitative estimate of the 
extent to which corruption reduces economic growth, especially in the near term, there is no doubt that it 
eventually takes its toll—on both the rate of growth, and the level and quality of domestic and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) that impact on growth. Moreover, given Uganda’s high dependency on aid for budget support, 
the donor community directly and indirectly (but unintentionally) finances corrupt practice (Anti-Corruption 
Coalition Uganda, 2011).The downside impact of corruption according Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda 2011 
report can be seen by the spread of “crony capitalism” among members of the political elite, including various 
“sweetheart” deals of dubious value that have been granted to attract foreign investors of questionable integrity 
(e.g. the recent leasing of the state-owned Dairy Corporation to a Thai investor for $1 and other deals approved 
outside official procedures). Corruption in Uganda is pervasive, and appears to involve prominent members of 
the first family, including President Museveni himself. Moreover, while some alleged acts of corruption have not 
resulted in prosecutions or convictions by the courts, these acts would be regarded as clear conflicts of interest in 
most countries. For example, the fact that a leading public official or his spouse participates in a business that 
has a contractual relationship with the Government of Uganda is not officially regarded as a corrupt practice so 
long as neither the official nor the business has violated the law. Such practice, however, even if “lawful,” meets 
the standard internationally accepted definition of corruption, i.e. the use of public office for private gain. 
Examples of corruption allegations surrounding the first family as per the 2011 Anti-corruption Coalition 
Uganda report are as follows: 
 Lt. General (retired) Salim Saleh (a.k.a. Caleb Akandwanaho)—President Museveni’s younger brother 
and the former head of the UPDF, who retains considerable influence over the army reserve. He owns Caleb 
International, now inactive, which used to procure equipment for the military, Saracen Ltd., which provides 
security services in and around Kampala, and several other companies including Efforte which in turn owned a 
40 percent stake in Entebbe Handling Services or ENHAS,a major contractor for ground services (passenger 
check-in, baggage and freight handling) at Entebbe International Airport. Saleh is alleged to have engaged in a 
number of scams involving the UPDF including the sale of “junk helicopters” to the army and the illegal export 
of gold, coltan and other minerals from the Congo during UPDF operations there in the late 1990s. His wife, 
Jovia Akandwanaho is also alleged to have been involved via several front companies that they both own or 
control.A commission of inquiry into the Congo matter implicated both, but concluded that it did not have 
supportable evidence to bring formal charges. However, in June 2005, the United States denied Jovia 
Akandwanaho a visa to visit the US on the grounds that she had engaged in corrupt acts. 
 Muhoozi Kainerugaba—President Museveni’s son, commander of the armored unit of the Presidential 
Guard Brigade and de facto head of the force. Kainerugaba was the former managing director of Caleb 
International. 
 Samuel Kutesa—currently the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a close advisor of the President. Kutesa 
was censured by the 6th Parliament for alleged conflicts of interest, but was retained in the Cabinet (indeed 
promoted to his current position) by the President. Kutesa was the co-owner (with Saleh) of the controlling 
interest of ENHAS and now owns 80 percent of the enterprise after buying Saleh’s share. His late wife was a 
cousin of Janet Museveni. His close friend, Hope Mwesigye is the Minister for Parliamentary affairs responsible 
for insuring that MPs supported the repeal of Article 105(2). His daughter is married to Muhoozi Kainerugaba. 
Another daughter was employed by Hunton and Williams, the London-based law and public relations firm 
retained by the Government of Uganda, and with an office in Washington. 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.20, 2015 
 
69 
 James Muhwezi—the Minister of Health. Muhwezi was also censured by the 6th parliament, but has 
continued in the Cabinet.The decision by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuburculosis and Malaria on August 
25th to suspend further disbursements to Uganda as a result of a “serious mismanagement” of its funds has also 
happened on his watch. His wife Susan is the special advisor to President Museveni on AGOA and a confidant 
of Janet Museveni. Her brother, Richard Kabonero, is a long-time diplomat at the Uganda Embassy in 
Washington. Another brother, Robert Kabonero, owns the distributorship that sells mobile phone airtime for 
Uganda Telecommunications Ltd., a semi-privatized firm in which the government retains a 49 percent share. 
 Jackie Mbabazi is the Managing Director of Luwero Industries, a government—owned firm that 
produces ammunition for the UPDF. Her husband, Amana Mbabazi, is the Minister of Defense. She is also the 
sister of Hope Mwesigye, close friend of Samuel Kutesa. Mrs. Mbabazi was previously a commissioner at the 
Uganda Revenue Authority where she was responsible for the collection of customs duties. She was transferred 
from her post following an investigation of corruption in that body regarding the failure of Danze, a defunct 
trading company owned by the NRM, that failed to pay duties due. 
The list goes on and on. It consists of a group of individuals around the President who have constructed a web of 
businesses, government contracts, and other schemes. Not surprisingly, they are among the most vocal 
supporters of the President’s running for another term. Their schemes not only enrich, but also provide a flow of 
income and patronage that sustain the regime. It now takes approximately $50,000 or more to run a credible 
campaign for the National Assembly. With the 2016 elections approaching many backbenchers are beginning to 
scramble for cash. It is the perfect time to assist compliant MPs who voted for the repeal of term limits while 
denying those who did not. As previously noted, the macroeconomic implications of corruption are unclear. The 
Government of Uganda, especially the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Uganda, try very hard to keep 
Uganda’s macro-economic house in order. They should be commended for their efforts. They know that this 
program has been the key to the large aid flows, particularly through budget support. But so do those engaged in 
deals of questionable propriety. Given the magnitude of aid that now approaches three-quarters of a billion 
dollars a year, combined with the opportunities for skimming by Museveni’s cronies, the President does not need 
to order the Bank of Uganda to print money as former president Daniel arap Moi ordered the Bank of Kenya to 
do in 1992 when that country faced its own transition to multiparty politics. Indeed, there is plenty of money and 
the official budgets for the Office of the President, the NRM secretariat, and the UPDF, that are not subject to the 
normal audit practices, or whose audits are not made public. 
The IMF has begun to question the sustainability of the current situation. The Uganda Revenue Authority 
currently collects only 12 percent of GDP, far less than the 24 percent collected by its counterpart in Kenya 
where aid flows cover only 11 to 12 percent of the country’s budget (Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2011). 
Put differently, excessively high aid flows, especially when provided as budget support, hold out few incentives 
for a country like Uganda to balance its budget on its own. This in turn according to Anti-Corruption Coalition 
Uganda nurtures corrupt practice by allowing tax cheats to continue avoiding their obligations. Low revenue 
generation combined with high levels of budget support also lay the foundation for a second debt crisis 
somewhere in the future. But, the bottom line is that this high volume of aid, particularly budget support, is a 
major financer of a neo-patrimonial regime (Kabwegyere, T.B, 1974).  
Furthermore, another illustration of how people close to the president are getting away with corruption and 
misuse of public funds involves the former Army Chief of staff of the Uganda armed forces, Mr Kazini, who is a 
relative of the first lady. While he was the commander of the 4th Division of the UPDF based in Gulu, it was 
reported in the Monitor Newspaper of 22 July 1997 that while the army account at the local Uganda Commercial 
Bank branch was almost always empty, the commander’s personal account which was in the same bank was 
running a turnover of over Ushs 800 million (equivalent to US$ 750,000) per month as a result of division funds 
being paid into it to conduct his personal business. No action was taken to investigate this mater and no action 
was taken against Kazini. Instead, he was later promoted from Commander of the 4 the Division to Army Chief 
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of Staff. He was later found to be involved in another scandal that involved the disappearance of $1 million 
dollars that was meant to pay Uganda soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Nothing was done 
until he was implicated in the case involving the so called ghost soldiers. Though he is dead under unclear 
circumstances, he went unprosecuted (Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2011). 
All the above cases are just examples of how lack of political will to fight corruption manifest itself in Uganda 
and how corruption is used by Museveni's NRM government to keep in power. They represent clear and 
indisputable circumstances when the due process of the law should have taken its full effect through the 
prosecution of corrupt high profile figures but who precisely because of their profile and closeness to the 
president were never prosecuted. It is also clear that the various institutions within the government responsible 
for combating and prosecuting corruption in the country have not been able to address corruption at the highest 
level. Corruption itself has been the life fabric of colonialism. All the forms of colonialism and its policies 
including divide-and-Rule were the highest expression of corruption. The fact that the NRM government uses 
corruption to hold onto power manifests how this evil colonial legacy will continue to keep Uganda more 
fragmented and in conflict. 
2.1.3 Human Rights Conditions 
Like the time of colonialism and the regimes of Museveni's predecessors, Uganda under Museveni today has 
registered serious human rights violations. According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices in 2010, Serious human rights problems in the country included arbitrary killings; vigilante 
killings; mob and ethnic violence; torture and abuse of suspects and detainees; harsh prison conditions; official 
impunity; arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention; incommunicado and lengthy pretrial detention; 
restrictions on the right to a fair trial and on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association; restrictions on 
opposition parties; electoral irregularities; official corruption; violence and discrimination against women and 
children, including female genital mutilation (FGM), sexual abuse of children, and the ritual killing of children; 
trafficking in persons; violence and discrimination against persons with disabilities and; restrictions on labor 
rights; and forced labor, including child labor. 
When a regime survives on systematic violation of the fundamental rights of the people it is supposed to protect, 
know that such a regime is degenerating in conflict. This explains why one can easily be arrested in Uganda for 
choosing to walk to work in protest to the government. Some of the first “walking to work” protests organized 
by Activists for Change in April, 2011 were directed particularly at rising transport prices. The government 
broke them up, arresting and charging Besigye and more than ten other politicians with inciting violence. Three 
days later it broke up “walks to work” in seven towns. In Gulu, a riot developed when Mao was arrested, 
resulting in soldiers shooting three persons dead. The army, led by Museve-ni’s son, took over the next protest 
from police, in which at least 47 were injured (Besigye was shot in the hand) and 220 arrested (International 
Crisis Group, 2012). Internal Affairs Minister Kivejinja told parliament demonstrations were not price-related 
but “part of a hate government campaign. It was for this reason therefore that police were instructed to disallow 
these activities”. The next week soldiers, deployed in ten dis-tricts, including Kampala, responded to new 
protests with bullets and teargas, killing one person. If a regime brutally cracks down a peaceful demonstration 
aimed ensuring that the people's demand are heard by the government, what comes next given the Uganda's past 
history?  
Crackdown on Homosexuals in Uganda under NRM government is yet another highest point of violation the 
fundamental human rights. In 2009, a Member of Parliament from the ruling National Resistance Movement, 
David Bahati, introduced a bill that will make it a crime to engage in, promote, or fail to report homosexuality. 
President Museveni reportedly has expressed his opposition to the bill. Members of Congress, the Obama 
Administration, and others in the international community have condemned the bill.  
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The draft bill states: 
 Any person who engages in homosexuality is liable to a fine not exceeding 500 currency points or 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or both. 
 Any person who engages in a homosexual act with someone who is under 18 years old could face the 
death penalty, if the offender is infected with HIV, the offender is a parent or guardian, the victim is disabled, 
and the accused is a serial offender. 
 Any individual who promotes homosexuality will face five years of imprisonment and fines. 
 Any person who fails to report commission of any offense in this act could face six months 
imprisonment. 
According to the author of the bill, David Bahati, “the pro-gays have made the world believe that whoever will 
be found guilty of getting involved in homosexuality will be sentenced to death. No. Only when an adult forces a 
child or someone under the age of 18 into homosexuality, that is, where the death penalty should apply.” In May 
2010, a committee setup by the Ugandan government reportedly recommended the withdrawal of the bill from 
parliament. The Ugandan Parliament adjourned in May 2011 without voting on the bill. In late January 2011, 
David Kato, a Ugandan gay rights activist, was beaten to death. Ugandan authorities have arrested one suspect. 
President Obama said he was “deeply saddened” about the death of Mr. Kato. 
Economically, Uganda under the current NRM government has no doubt moved from a state of economic 
suffocation during Obote and Amin's refimes to economic recovery with some donor support. This has been 
evidenced by increased level of micro-economic development in the country. But this “economic ‘miracle’ 
according to Barkan .Joel D , Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa has benefited some ethnic 
groups far more than others, a fact that sows the seeds of potential conflict along ethno-regional lines.” By this, 
the NRM government continued to keep high the economic fault lines between north and south created by the 
British. The North continues to trail down under the weight of poverty while the south moves out of poverty. The 
proportion of the population living in poverty across the South and in the West for example is now roughly 27 
percent, while the one in the North remains high at 63 percent followed by the East at 46 (international Crisis 
Group, 2012).  
Furthermore, Uganda is blessed with fertile soils, regular rainfall, and sizable deposits of copper and cobalt. Its 
largest sector is agriculture, which employs 78% of the workforce and accounted for about 90% of export 
earnings and 23.4% of Uganda’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Coffee exports make up half of its export 
earnings, and Uganda is Africa’s largest coffee producer. Other major exports include cotton, tea, and to a lesser 
extent, maize. Crop production has been hampered by security concerns in the northern and western regions of 
Uganda. The 20 years of LRA war forced many northern Ugandans into IDPs as such it has seriously disrupted 
agricultural productivity in the region. According to USAID officials in Uganda, the restoration of normal 
farming practices is essential to the recovery process. However, the NRM government has been so reluctant in 
establishing programmes to facilitate the recovery process. The only government programme, Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund is heavily embedded with corruption with no tangible results. Most farmers in the North are 
still locked in the use of traditional, less efficient farming tools while the farmers in other regions, south and west 
have moved ahead to using modern farming tools such as tractors distributed by the government. This is how 
selective NRM government is in proving the lives of Ugandans, still along the colonial south and north fault 
lines. The industrial sector has also expanded, with real output growth approaching 10% a year. Industry 
constituted 20.4% of GDP in 2004/2005. The main industries include the processing of coffee, cotton, tea, sugar, 
tobacco, edible oils, dairy products, and grain milling as well as brewing. Other ventures include vehicle 
assembly and the manufacture of textiles and metal products. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (May 
2011), real GDP growth is estimated at 6.3% in 2011, and 7% in 2012. However, the dividends of this growth 
are shared by few who keep Museveni in power. Above all the location of these industries in the south points to 
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how colonial the NRM government has remained. Worst still, Most of the companies are either owned by 
foreign investors or prominent Ugandan business people who get licenses corruptly in turn for financing 
Museveni's political ambitions. 
Privatization initiatives pose a problem, as they are seen by many to be a scramble for previously state-owned 
property, which in most cases are purpotively purchased by the first family in the name of prominent business 
men and women in the country. President Museveni has heavily made use the Indians he return after being 
chased away by former President Idi Amin to buy off government parastatal. Examples of such deals include the 
sale of former Uganda Hotel property to Maldivani Group companies of Indian origin, Entebbe Airport, and 
many other government businesses. These matters are not only known to the highly educated but every averagely 
educated Ugandan. 
The late June 2009 discovery of an oil reserve in the fields of western Uganda much larger than initially 
estimated has many speculating about the potential implications for Uganda’s economy. The oil was discovered 
in an exploratory mission by oil and gas groups Heritage and Tullow. The oil reserve is located in the Albertine 
Basin, close to Uganda’s border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. These are already cases of corruption 
in the oil deals. Some NRM members of parliament have been branded by Museveni as 'rebel Mps' for opposing 
him and his cohorts on the proposed oil bill which gives the minister responsible absolute powers to award 
contracts and revoke them at will. The NRM Mps who saw this as a channel for corruption stood up to oppose it. 
This has led to the expulsion of the Mps namely Theodore Ssekikubo, Wilfred Nuwagaba, Barnabas 
Tinkasimire, and Mohammed Nsereko from the party on on unfounded claims that they were being found guilty 
by the party's Central Executive Committee for malicious propaganda, decampaigning official party candidates 
in recently held by-elections, and working for foreign interests in oil and gas affairs (The Daily Monitor, 2013). 
This is how the divide-and-Rule works for Museveni and his NRM government even after 50 years of 
independence; work with those who are ready to cooperate even in dubious deals and throughout or at most 
eliminate any one who dares to oppose him. 
In conclusion, Museveni’s governance trajectory resembles those of Obote and Amin – without the blatant 
brutality – beginning with policies of tolerance and inclusion that gradually change to exclusion and repression. 
All three have relied on personal rule, rather than constitutional and institutional restraints, and turned 
increasingly to patronage and coercion to govern. Museveni is more skillful than his predecessors and had 
greater political opportunity to overcome the cleavage between tribes as well as between Buganda and the 
central government, but he has not found a workable solution. Nor has he been willing to tolerate any opposition 
that might threaten his rule. To work with either Buganda kingdom officials or political parties, he needs to 
accept restraints, but the prospect of large oil revenues makes this less likely, since they offer potential to sustain, 
even extend, his patronage system. Furthermore, Museveni has adroitly deflected Western criticism of his 
growing authoritarianism and of government corruption, while preserving substantial development aid and 
security assistance. However, tensions are building, and patronage and repression may be insufficient to keep 
Uganda stable much longer. There is likelihood of Uganda falling back into chaos if a remedy is not sorted for. 
3.0 Proposals to avert these problems 
As earlier on alluded to, the 53 years existence of Uganda as an independent political entity has been a 
continuum of political, social and economic upheaval. The problems that were set during colonialism continue to 
ravage this country. None of Uganda's leader has offered a tangible and lasting solutions that would keep the 
country in peace and prosperity. This paper articulates that the solutions to Uganda's continues unrest lye in her 
dubious politics in dire need of reforms and this would consequently improve people’s social and economic 
spheres as presented below.  
3.1 Good governance and Democracy 
Good governance as Patrick Chabal (1992: 169) rightly notes, is a rare commodity in the history of the world 
especially in countries of the Third World. The process of its evolution within the context of plural politics, is 
often fraught with serious tensions, conflicts and contradictions. However, as Patrick Chabal further augmented, 
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the capacity of the political rulers to manage the process effectively, the resilience of the civil society and the 
nature of the international political economy are some of the important factors which will ultimately determine 
the extent to which democracy could cohabitate with good governance and whether both will survive in 
countries like Uganda. All the bad practice in Uganda from colonialism to post-colonial era were as a result of 
lack of good governance and democracy. Colonialism itself is undemocratic and a perfect epitome of bad 
governance and its bad policies that continue to persist in the governance of post-colonial Uganda can only be 
reduced or at most eliminated by employing good governance and democracy. Uganda needs to embrace good 
governance and democracy that will bring about proper accountability, transparency in her political, economic 
and social spheres. Good governance will further bring about prevalence of rule of law and respect for institution 
established for proper functioning of the state. Its good governance that will pave way for real democracy, which 
all the leaders of Uganda have failed to realize, including president Museveni who claims to be the only 
visionary Ugandan. 
3.1.1 Inclusive Political Settlement 
Secondly, it is imperative to mold an all-inclusive political settlement that is pegged largely on the interest and 
support of the peoples and communities in the country many of which hitherto have been excluded from full 
participation in the exercise of their country’s political power. 
I feel that this approach could borrow a leaf from the 1961/62 Lancaster Conference through which the country 
worked out its transition to political independence. This process is imperative to the resolution of political 
problems of Uganda and would help usher in a new beginning for Uganda. The contemporary times and its 
dynamics call for a new political settlement and a national democratic transition (like that which happened in 
South Africa- i.e. from Apartheid to the new democratic South Africa) for Uganda. I believe this is the only 
credible way the gun can be taken out of Uganda’s politics and through which a new political consensus can be 
evolved that can return Uganda to the condition of an asset country which is at peace within itself and all its 
neighbours. It’s also the only credible way we believe Uganda can be saved from degenerating into another cycle 
of bloodletting and possibly to a much larger scale than ever witnessed before. This approach (a national and 
democratic political resolution to Uganda’s recurrent problems) calls, among other things, the resolution of key 
and accumulated outstanding issues including: 
 The Power relations question. Establishment of Democracy and Rule of Law so absent in Uganda from 
colonial time till today. 
 Viable programs to foster and institute sustainable peace. 
 The question on the Army and Security systems. 
 The National Resources, Land and Environmental questions especially regarding the equitable sharing 
of these resources irrespective of which region or tribe leadership originates from. 
 Questions of partnerships with Foreign and International capital in National Development. 
 Questions on wealth creation, distribution and sharing. 
 The Humanitarian and Welfare Questions. 
 The foreign relations question. 
 The Question of Reparations and Compensation to the victims and Reconstruction of war destroyed 
areas such as Northern Uganda. 
 The Justice and National Reconciliation questions. 
 Corruption and its ills 
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Finding viable answers to these issues will be an example that will find significant positive echo throughout the 
length and breathe of the riparian lands of the Nile River, the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. 
In making this path possible, World Powers that hold leverage over the political power circles in Uganda and its 
President should work in tandem with the hitherto politically marginalized and excluded forces that are 
representatives of the peoples and communities in the country and all other interested groups that have hitherto 
been excluded from real political participation in the politics of the country. It is only through this that a way can 
be paved out of the current threateningly explosive crisis in Uganda. 
I strongly believe that to avert a deeper and bloody conflict and war, it will be imperative to make Yoweri 
Museveni into a Frederick de Klerk of Uganda; to mold him into a personage and political element with whom to 
generate the necessary democratic Uganda. All who support the rise of a replicable example of peaceful and 
transformative change and the overall dynamic development in the Nile River valley lands, the Great Lakes 
Region and the Horn of Africa countries need in this regard to lend necessary support to the people of Uganda in 
the long odyssey for democratic renewal of the country and entire region. 
This support is not only requisite, but critical in the realization of the common democratic and developmental 
objectives in Uganda and the pivotal region of Africa. A new appreciation, creative and imaginative adaption of 
the viable examples and subsequent democratic experiences of Northern Ireland and South Africa may help to 
pave the way out of and forward from the political imbroglio of Uganda and to a certain extent the larger Nile 
River valley countries, the Great Lakes Region countries, the Horn of Africa and indeed Africa itself. 
3.1.2  Restoration of presidential term limits. 
Restoration of presidential term limits is one of the key recommendations to avoid the recurrence of violent 
change of governments in Uganda. The presidential term limit as encrypted in Article 105(2) of the Constitution 
that limits individual incumbents for the presidency to two elected terms was repealed in 2005 to allow President 
Museveni more time in office. This came to be known as project kisanja. Museveni, in essence said, “You can 
have multiparty politics at the price of my continuation as president.” Museveni himself has constantly justified 
the move on various grounds—that he is still young and vigorous, that there is unfinished work to be done, and 
that any likely successor will likely “mess up” Uganda and “not listen to me” were he to retire and follow the 
model for African elder statesmen set by Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela. Stated simply, President Museveni 
now regards himself and his presidency as indispensable for Uganda’s future well-being, which to me is far from 
the reality. The critical question is what is it that Museveni will do for Uganda again when he has failed to do it 
in the 29 years as president? Presidential terms limit should be restored as a sign of respect for the constitution to 
set a better precedence for the leaders to come. It is to me the highest expression of democracy and good 
governance so that other Ugandans are given chance to lead the country and avoid the bad precedence being set 
by the previous leaders that Uganda's leader must always be bombed out of office for change. 
3.1.3  Reforms in electoral laws 
Uganda's electoral laws should be reformed particularly the law that makes the chairperson of the electoral 
commission a political appointee by the president. This has been the source of dubious electoral practices. It 
should instead be replace by an electoral board representative of all the political parties. This will bring about 
transparency and accountability in this institution. 
4.0 Conclusion 
In conclusion, one may say one of the British colonial legacies in Uganda is that they brought together people 
who lived in their different tribal cocoons with different political, social, religious and economic settings under 
one demarcated territorial entity called Uganda. But the question whether this legacy sort to unify the multi-
ethnic state of Uganda due to the conflicts that characterized the post-colonial Uganda keeps Ugandans 
pondering. The British with the divide-and-Rule produced through decentralized despotism a state that got 
entangle in racism, and widespread tribalism with Buganda chiefs very instrumental in consolidating British rule 
in the rest of Uganda, which intensified ethnic cleavages and conflicts. The British economic policies led to the 
underdevelopment of the local industries and stifling of the private sector and thus bringing about the racial 
tensions between the Indians and Africans. The colonial policies further exacerbated regional inequalities where 
production and wealth were effectively concentrated in the south while the north was used as labour reservoir 
and later soldiers, thus the famous “south and north fault line”. At independence, Uganda needed a leader(s) who 
would work to dismantle these colonial constructions in order to set the basis for proper democratization and 
peaceful coexistence among the tribes. As Mamdani noted, to achieve a meaningful level of democratization, 
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colonial constructions that are divisive in nature had to be transcended through a process of deconstruction of its 
bases. The major objective of any serious nation-state project should have been to dismantle and concurrently to 
rebuild institutions for deconstruction of such colonial distortions in the development process of the country 
(Mamdani 1996:288-290)  
Unfortunately, the post-colonial leaders did not work out to correct these political, social and economic 
distortions the colonialists created but instead inherited and nurtured this weed of division (ethnic 
incompatibility). Although President Museveni in his honey moon years in power tried to offer solution to these 
distortions but as time went on, he is seen to have fallen back in to the mistakes of his predecessors with some 
political analysts saying his regime is increasingly becoming worse than that of his predecessors, Obote and 
Amin. The reforms by the political leadership that inherited these distortions were limited as concerns the 
deconstruction of the political bases of ethnic consciousness, restructuring the economy to defuse the ethnic and 
regional material expression and the liberation of the civil society. That means no post-colonial government 
seems to have provided a sustainable solution to the confusions created by the British thus explaining why we 
see recurrence of violent conflicts in this country. 
However, Uganda may have a grip of peace, unity and development if the above mentioned recommendations 
are taken into consideration.  
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